Western University

Scholarship@Western
Business Publications

Business (Richard Ivey School of Business)

5-2018

Beyond Numbers: How investment managers
accommodate societal issues in financial decisions
Diane-Laure Arjaliès
Ivey Business School, darjalies@ivey.ca

Pratima Bansal
Ivey Business School

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iveypub
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
Citation of this paper:
Arjaliès, Diane-Laure and Bansal, Pratima, "Beyond Numbers: How investment managers accommodate societal issues in financial
decisions" (2018). Business Publications. 8.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iveypub/8

Beyond numbers:
How investment managers accommodate societal issues in financial decisions

Diane-Laure Arjaliès
Ivey Business School, Western University (Canada)

Pratima (Tima) Bansal
Ivey Business School, Western University (Canada)

8 February 2018

Referred as: Arjaliès D-L., Bansal T. (2018), Beyond Numbers: How Investment Managers
Accommodate Societal Issues in Financial Decisions, Organization Studies, 39, 695-725.

Abstract

Investment managers use financial numbers to assess the quality of their portfolios, which requires them
to estimate the market value of their assets—i.e., the priced trading of such assets. Prior research has
shown that investment managers tend to disregard information that does not easily integrate into
financial numbers, such as environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria. We argue that when
investment managers use visuals to incarnate ESG criteria, they are more likely to accommodate societal
issues in their financial decisions. We undertook a three-year ethnography of an asset management
company to better understand how investment managers respond to ESG criteria. We found that fixedincome investment managers attempted to include ESG criteria in their financial models by
financializing the data, so that ESG-related information could be commensurated with their existing
models. Equity investment managers, on the other hand, did not financialize ESG issues, but introduced
the use of visuals, specifically emojis, to incarnate ESG issues. In this way, ESG criteria were juxtaposed
with, rather than integrated into, financial criteria. In doing so, equity managers created a sense of
dissonance between financial numbers and the visuals, which fostered creative friction. The visuals
permitted equity managers to analyze the ESG criteria not only for their financial insights, but also for
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the social and environmental information that could not be financialized. We discuss the implications
of these findings for prior research on financialization and calculative devices.
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Beyond numbers:
How investment managers accommodate societal issues in financial decisions

The financial services industry has profoundly transformed capitalism since the 1970s. By
December 2013, investment management firms managed US$97 trillion assets globally —the equivalent
of the global annual gross domestic product (GDP) (Lund et al., 2013; TheCityUK, 2014). Financial
motives and markets now shape the day-to-day operation of economies and societies (Arjaliès, Grant,
Hardie, MacKenzie, & Svetlova, 2017; Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005). This growth in the importance
of the financial sector, known as financialization, is the process of evaluating objects, practices and
individuals based on their market value. Financialization implies that almost any thing can be assigned
a monetary equivalent for its tradeable value in a market. These values are often expressed as financial
numbers and ratios, such as net present value and price-to-book ratio. Not only does such reasoning
transform the non-financial into the financial (Chiapello, 2017), such calculative processes also discard
information that is incommensurable with numbers, such as information embodied in human values and
emotions. Through this process of financialization, it is possible to argue that the financial sector has
been fashioning society (Davis, 2010; Davis & Kim, 2015).
Some researchers have argued that society has also been fashioning the financial sector by
accommodating an ever-widening range of information, including environmental, social and governance
(ESG) criteria, which capture societal issues, such as pollution, labour policies and directors’
independence (e.g. Sullivan, Martindale, Feller, & Bordon, 2015). Most prior research in this area shows
that these ESG criteria are simply quantified, in order to introduce societal issues efficiently into existing
financial analysis (Crane, Graham, & Himick, 2015; Eccles, Krzus, Rogers, & Serafeim, 2012).
However, this view presents almost a caricature of investment managers as homo economicus
who efficiently and automatically calculate firm value based on financial numbers; yet, there is ample
evidence to show that many investment managers use personal judgments and intuition (de Larminat,
2013; Godechot, 2001; Ortiz, 2014). If so, then it is quite possible that the range of reactions of
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investment managers to ESG criteria has not been fully uncovered. Therefore, we were interested in
understanding how investment managers accommodate ESG criteria in their investment decisions. To
shed light on this question, we conducted a three-year ethnographic study of a French asset management
company, investigating the decisions made by investment managers in selecting fixed-income and
equities portfolios. We collected insights from participant observations, interviews and corporate
documents.
We found that the behavior of fixed-income managers was consistent with prior literature: fixed
income managers relied heavily on financial numbers, so that ESG criteria became a constraint, which
was ultimately abandoned. In stark contrast, equity managers did not fashion ESG criteria into financial
numbers, but found ways to sustain the different type of information embodied in ESG criteria by
representing societal issues through visuals, such as emojis. Consequently, ESG criteria were not
commensurated with financial numbers and created a “sense of dissonance” (Stark, 2011) between the
financial and societal aspects of the decision. Equity managers were able to generate a fruitful friction
between the two different types of calculative devices (numbers and visuals) and thereby sustain the
richness inherent in ESG criteria.
These empirical insights permit us to theorize the mechanisms through which the form of
expression (e.g., financial numbers versus emojis) can stimulate a sense of dissonance to help address
ESG issues that may otherwise disappear when commensurated with financial numbers. We elaborate
on the experiences of fixed-income managers and equity managers to describe the methods by which
non-financial, societal issues can enter the financial sphere while maintaining their qualitative
differences. Our insights offer important implications for research on financialization and calculative
devices.
Literature Review
Financial numbers as calculative devices
Financial numbers are a form of calculative device, which we define as the artifacts and physical objects
that help actors establish “distinctions between things or states of the world, and by imagining and
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estimating courses of action associated with those things or with those states as well as their
consequences” (Callon & Muniesa, 2005, p. 1231). These devices include not only financial numbers,
but also visuals, graphs, texts, colors and processes. Such calculative devices matter in organizations
and organizing because they mediate between the social and the material, and are often seen as sociomaterial arrangements or simply sociomateriality (Beunza, Hardie, & MacKenzie, 2006; Callon, 1998;
MacKenzie, 2009), as they reflect what is deemed valuable in a specific context (Barman, 2015; Gond
& Nyberg, 2017). They help market actors make decisions.
The primary calculative devices used in the financial services industry are financial numbers—
prices, ratios, probabilities and formulas. Financial numbers do not need to be expressed in monetary
terms (e.g., as measures of risk and volatility), but they must help organizations assess the worth of their
assets based on their market value. For this reason, financial numbers tend to rely heavily on financial
economics and mathematical finance.
Financialization has permeated all types of organizations, making financial numbers the
dominant calculative device of contemporary societies (Chiapello, 2017; Davis, 2010). There are several
reasons for this hegemony (Alvehus & Spicer, 2012; Chiapello, 2014). First, financial numbers are
particularly effective in aligning diverse viewpoints (Vollmer, Mennicken, & Preda, 2009). They
provide market actors with common criteria across disciplinary boundaries. Second, neoclassical
economics—on which much management theory builds—assumes that prices are the best means of
coordinating supply and demand. Third, financial numbers facilitate the commensuration process, which
transforms diverse qualities into a common set of specific metrics (Espeland & Stevens, 1998).
Commensuration standardizes decision processes, thereby securing control and building efficiencies
that save time and help organizations scale up.
Last, financial numbers are attractive because they convey authority and imbue confidence,
thanks to their perceived scientific basis (Porter, 1996; Power, 2004). Whitley (1986, p. 175) argues that
the use of large computers and databases in the 1950s and 1960s made quantitative capital markets
research more “scientific” and “rigorous” than “old” business finance. Chua (1996, p. 140) further
explains that market actors preferred financial numbers because they expressed “neutrality”,
5

“objectivity” and “independence.” In sharp contrast, she argues that non-quantitative calculative devices
were dismissed as “subjective”, “mere opinion” or “metaphysical speculation.” The absence of
substitutes to financial numbers has transformed the latter into a kind of “fatal remedy” (Power, 2004,
p. 767), so that actors focus on the measures rather than the problem being solved.
Visuals as calculative devices
Visuals are also a form of calculative device and can include graphs, pictures, drawings, schemas, color
codes and images.1 Previous research has notably shown that visuals are appropriate devices to convey
emotions and ideals (Qu & Cooper, 2011), and visuals appeal to specific forms of reasoning (Meyer,
Höllerer, Jancsary, & Van Leeuwen, 2013). For these reasons, corporate social responsibility reports
include images to better communicate organizational ideology and values (Höllerer, Jancsary, Meyer,
& Vettori, 2013; Preston, Wright, & Young, 1996). Likewise, social activists and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) often employ provocative visuals to evoke public reactions (Meyer et al., 2013).
Visuals are persuasive, by representing abstract ideas in concrete and clear forms (Pollock & D’Adderio,
2012). Most prior research on visuals tends to compare visuals with text, but little work has investigated
the relationship between numbers and visuals.
Visuals are particularly useful in addressing inconsistencies in organizational life. For example,
the physical attributes of visuals permit different viewpoints or objectives to be assembled in the same
figure, such as a little girl standing in front of a nuclear plant (Höllerer et al., 2013; Kaplan, 2011).
Unlike the case of financial numbers, activities cannot be commensurated into a single number in the
case of visuals. Instead visuals connect different entities and sustain their differences (Busco &
Quattrone, 2015; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2009). Individuals are encouraged to fill the “blank” spaces of
visuals with their own thoughts and connect them to their own practical experiences (e.g., through a
Balanced Scorecard). Similarly, colors can evoke emotions and signal associations in ways that numbers

1

Although graphs are a form of visuals, for the purposes of this paper, we treat them as financial numbers, as, in
the context of investment management, they often derive from financial numbers (i.e., graphical representations
of financial and mathemetical equations).
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cannot. Thanks to their multivocality and flexibility, visuals channel the creation of knowledge by acting
as “rhetorical machines” (Busco & Quattrone, 2017).
Little research has been undertaken on the role of visuals in the financialization process, likely
because of the financial sector’s heavy reliance on financial numbers as calculative devices. In practice,
however, investment managers have been shown to inform their investment decisions by mobilizing
alternative forms of knowledge, including intuition, personal judgments, emotions and even scents
(Arjaliès et al., 2017). In a context similar to investment managers, Cabantous and Dupont-Courtade
(2015) show that catastrophe risk analysts—who evaluate the exposure of insurance companies to
catastrophic risks (e.g., hurricanes and earthquakes)—do not rely blindly on catastrophe modelling.
Instead, the risk analysts form their own judgments of the extent and nature of the risks under study.
This interplay between “literary” (personal judgment) work and “computational” (financial numbers)
work—referred to as “qualculative practices” (Cochoy, 2008; Cochoy & Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013)—
is central to the finance industry (Taffler, Spence, & Eshraghi, 2017), yet has received little scholarly
attention.
The financialization of environmental, social and governance criteria
Businesses are expected to help solve societal problems (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; Scherer &
Palazzo, 2011), and they can do so by assessing their environmental, social and governance (ESG)
performance (e.g., Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013; Gond & Nyberg, 2017). As in the rest of the economy,
the “ideology of numbers” (Chelli & Gendron, 2013) has dominated the construction of ESG criteria
(Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016), which are often reflected by financial numbers. For instance, carbon
emissions are priced according to their market value, and safety incidents are priced by time lost through
injuries. Cooper et al. (2016) demonstrate how the network of social institutions and agents that protect
homeless people in London (UK) calculate the “average net present value” of each individual cohort
member entering the social system. This type of calculation is driven by those who advocate for the
integration of ESG issues into business, in their quest to provide market actors with standardized,
quantitative metrics that can render such impacts calculable, financially valuable and achievable
(Barman, 2015; Déjean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010).
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The process of converting ESG issues into financial numbers is a reflection of financialization,
which is the “gradual colonisation by specific ‘financialized’ techniques and calculation methods” of
spaces that were previously outside the financial sphere (Chiapello, 2014). Some researchers praise the
use of financial measures through ESG criteria to account for the financial impact of ESG issues on
business, whether positive or negative (Eccles et al., 2012; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015). Financialization
has provided legitimacy to ESG issues within organizations and markets because ESG criteria conform
more generally with market value (Arjaliès, 2010; Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013).
Others have denounced the financialization of social and environmental issues because nature
and life should not or cannot be priced (Chelli & Gendron, 2013; Chiapello, 2014). Opponents worry
that “these forms of quantification come to dominate others, imposing their forms of valuation, and
building up a world that could be described as one-dimensional (Marcuse, 1964)” (Chiapello, 2014, p.
15). Important dimensions and positions of ESG issues may be subordinated or missed, so that actors
penalize some stakeholders or harm the planet (Chua, 1996).
As well, the financialization of ESG issues risks losing the original distinction between financial
and ESG issues. Actors can reify the financial values assigned to ESG issues, missing the non-financial
dimensions that may also be at play. Financializing ESG criteria decontextualizes the societal and
natural environment, so that the criteria no longer reflect the phenomena they were intended to represent.
For instance, the ability to purchase naming rights of parks and civic spaces enables funding for these
spaces, but also commodifies these spaces, by suggesting they can be bought and sold (Sandel, 2012).
Financialization can also have a detrimental effect on ESG issues themselves. Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000) find that imposing fines on parents who pick up their children late from daycare does
not reduce, but rather increases, their tardiness. The authors show that parents feel entitled to be late
because they pay for the service. Vik (2016) argues that quantifying a monetized value for the social
impact generated prevents the microfinance sector from credibly determining its impacts on customers,
which is detrimental to the beneficiaries themselves. Although criticisms could be levied against
financializing ESG criteria, little discussion has addressed the alternative forms of calculative devices
in which ESG criteria can be fashioned.
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Beyond numbers: Creating a sense of dissonance
A few scholars have studied how financial actors accommodate ESG criteria in their decision making.
Mehrpouya and Samiolo’s (2016) ethnography describes how analysts rank companies based on the
access to medicine that these companies provide in developing countries. The authors find that ESG
analysts behave as “robots” (p. 22), putting aside their own judgments of the rankings, to be
“impersonal” and “mechanical” (p. 25).
ESG analysts argue that the financialization processes give them legitimacy, but they also
confess that these obligations conflict with their own value systems that do not lend themselves to
financial numbers. Tan (2014) identifies similar tensions in his study of the integration of corporate
governance by sell-side financial analysts, as does du Rietz (2014) in her study of Swedish institutional
investors applying ESG criteria to their investments. This dissonance between financial numbers and
other calculative devices is not confined to ESG analysts but can also be seen among financial actors
more broadly.
Addressing this issue, Beunza and Stark (2012) study how traders in an arbitrage room used
dialogue and analogies to build cognitive distance between the financial analysis and their interpretation,
in order to create a “sense of dissonance.” This distance stimulated creative friction and deliberate
thought, ultimately leading to better financial decisions. Dissonance arises because there is “more than
one framework for measuring worth” (Hutter, Stark, & Berthoin Antal, 2015, p. 5), and the different
frameworks yield different outcomes. Understanding how traders complement computational work with
literary work (Cochoy, 2008; Cochoy & Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013) offers potential alternatives to the
financialization of ESG issues.
Research Methods
The research context
Between 2000 and 2005, most asset management companies in France were only starting to integrate
ESG criteria into their investment processes. The company we studied—a small asset management
company, managing €2 billion worth of assets, and a subsidiary of one of the biggest French mutual
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insurance companies—began introducing Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds as early as 1997.
This interest in SRI funds was motivated by the parent company, which belongs to the social economy
sector that puts people before profits and therefore aims to invest its assets responsibly. Despite its
position as a pioneer in the field, the company lost ground to its competitors and was having difficulty
attracting new clients.
In 2005, a new CEO, recruited to reverse this trend, launched two working groups tasked with
integrating ESG criteria in both equity and fixed-income investment processes. Whereas equity
investments entailed buying shares on the stock market to capitalize on increases in their future value,
fixed-income investments involved lending money to borrowers (a company or public issuer) in
exchange for principal plus interest. Each group was composed of investment managers, ESG analysts
and sales managers. The investment managers differed between both groups: equity managers were
responsible for the redesign of the equity investment processes, and fixed-income managers for the
fixed-income investment processes. ESG analysts were buy-side analysts (i.e., employed by the asset
management company itself) whose job was to help investment managers identify the best socially
responsible and financially interesting companies and public issuers. The timeline for this redesign
process was expected to last several weeks, but ultimately took one year.
Data sources
The study initially began with a broad research question examining how fixed-income and equity
managers were integrating ESG criteria into their practices. To better understand this phenomenon, the
first author conducted a three-year ethnographic study of this asset management company.
Participant observation. The ethnographer observed investment managers and ESG analysts almost
every day for two and a half years (2006–2009). This access was made possible by a research contract
between the French Ministry of Research and Education, the University and the company, known as
CIFRE (Convention Industrielle de Formation par la Recherche en Entreprise).
The ethnographer’s formal role was as an ESG analyst, in which she analyzed companies and
countries using the calculative devices associated with each type of investment. She attended all the
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meetings of both working groups and gleaned insights in informal settings, such as coffee and lunch
breaks. She spoke regularly at the meetings, together with the other ESG analysts. For instance, she
explained the potential effects of investment managers’ suggestions on the ESG analysis of companies
she was assessing. Following a reflexive ethnographic approach (Whyte, 1943), she detailed the main
events of each day in a diary, which in the end comprised hundreds of pages of notes. To gain industrylevel insights, she also participated in think-tank events, working groups, SRI roadshows, conferences
and business meetings with consultants, agencies and brokers, attending nearly 40 formal events per
year. These formal meetings were complemented by many informal discussions with various industry
actors.
Semi-structured interviews. To supplement this rich ethnographic data, the ethnographer conducted
three rounds of interviews (23 in total). The first round in 2006, prior to the official launch of the working
groups, assessed analysts’ practices before the redesign. She asked interviewees to describe their jobs,
their views on SRI funds and the corporation where they were working.
The ethnographer conducted a second round of interviews, after the redesign process in 2009,
in which she aimed to understand interviewees’ perceptions of the process—whether it was successful,
how the redesign unfolded, why group members acted in certain ways and how they interpreted the
actions of other members. A third round of follow-up interviews in 2015 involved interviewing prior
working group members and new employees working on the investment processes. These interviews,
designed to delve deeper into the long-term effects of the redesign of investment processes, were
coupled with two days of observation.
Documents and secondary evidence. We collected and scrutinized large volumes of data, including
minutes of meetings, emails, information on calculative devices and presentations of processes to
clients. Our analysis also included documents and secondary sources at the industry level, including the
social rating agencies’ and brokers’ evaluation tools purchased by the company. Appendix 1 summarizes
the data sources.
Data Analysis
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We analyzed the data in four stages. At each stage, we moved back and forth between the data, the
literature and the emerging theoretical constructs, as is frequently the practice in qualitative studies of
organizational change processes. We were most interested in analyzing the fixed-income analysts’ and
equity analysts’ different approaches to financializing ESG issues. Our investigation found that
calculative devices, specifically the legitimacy extended to non-financial numbers, to be of primary
importance in the (non) financialization of ESG issues. The analysis unfolded through an inductive
open-ended process of gradual abstraction, which we elaborate on below.
Stage 1: Developing working group narratives
For each working group, we created a narrative description and a timeline of key debates and changes
to investment practices during the (re)design (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007). Observation and
interview data provided in-depth insights into the evolution of meanings, interactions, practices and
calculative devices. Once we had constructed a narrative account for each group, we confirmed the
accuracy of the accounts by reporting them to company managers. Using multiple data sources, we
began identifying key features of the equity and fixed-income managers’ calculative devices that helped
us differentiate between each group’s interpretations of ESG criteria.

Stage 2: Identifying key codes
Using the chronological narrative developed in the previous stage, we organized the data using
“generative” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 274) questions as a schema: How did each group perceive ESG
issues? How did each group adopt ESG criteria? This schema served as a guide for categorizing the
codes and clustering them into themes. Being empirically grounded, these first-order codes were not yet
formulated in theoretical terms, and used actors’ own language (Van Maanen, 1979). For example, we
developed codes such as “fixed-income as a rational process” or “role as a manager to serve society.”
Throughout the coding process, we tracked emerging and recurring codes along with representative
quotes and examples.
We used field observations and documentary evidence to verify the accuracy of the
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interviewees’ statements. For instance, when fixed-income managers explained that it was impossible
to integrate ESG criteria into their financial models, we asked for these financial models and discussed
their content with finance colleagues. We carried out the coding process until we had a clear picture of
the first-order codes. At the end of this stage, we had a comprehensive understanding of the experiences
in each working group.
Stage 3: Identifying ESG adoption patterns
We used axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to identify commonalities and differences across the
two types of investment (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). This process
allowed us to generate a set of second-order codes that enabled us to differentiate between each group’s
interpretations and actions. Iterations between the raw data, codes, narratives and theory allowed us to
refine our findings and relate them to existing theories on calculative devices and on financialization
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Given the central role of ESG criteria, we compared both groups on the
calculative devices they used and their perception of ESG issues. At the end of this analysis, we were
convinced of the importance of the role of calculative devices in fashioning the practices of each group.
Stage 4: Understanding the nature of calculative devices
During the last stage of analysis, we sought to understand how the calculative devices we discovered
shaped the practices of each group. We were particularly interested in exploring further whether the
form of calculative devices influenced the financialization of ESG criteria. Our analysis was informed
by performative approaches used in visual accounting research (Davison & Warren, 2017; Justesen &
Mouritsen, 2009). Drawing on Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1992), these approaches are based on the
assumption that realities are constructed through the interactions between individuals and their
inscriptions. This research method follows the trajectories of calculative devices and considers their
effects on practices. The attention is not on the inscriptions that are produced (i.e., the financial numbers
or the ESG criteria), but on the unfolding of practices produced by these inscriptions. Key to this analysis
is the study of the relationships between the devices themselves, which in our study is the relationship
between emojis and financial numbers.
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Findings
In the following sections, we will show that fixed-income managers did not integrate ESG issues into
their investment practices because they could not fit ESG criteria into their financial models. Equity
managers, on the other hand, financialized the ESG criteria provided by social rating agencies by
creating new calculative devices that avoided financialization. We will show that the combination of
two different physical forms of calculative devices—financial numbers and visuals—helped trigger a
sense of dissonance between ESG and financial criteria.
Appendices 2 and 3 summarize the investment processes; further details about why these two
processes occurred are described below. Unless otherwise indicated, all interviewees’ excerpts used in
the findings originate from the 2009 round of interviews.

Fixed-income Managers
The inability to design ESG criteria that mirrored financial criteria. Fixed-income managers did not
integrate ESG issues into their investment practices primarily because they claimed to be unable to
quantify the financial value of ESG impacts. Two types of problems prevented the design of such
calculative devices.
First, the ESG criteria provided by social rating agencies appeared less objective and reliable
than the financial criteria that they often used:
RESEARCHER: So, in theory, ESG criteria could be useful for you but they’re no help
at the moment?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Exactly, since we don’t have anything to measure them,
there’s no point in looking at them [ESG criteria]. […] I think that [social] rating
agencies are totally incapable of doing this. […] They [ESG criteria] are so
approximate that it’s impossible to rely on them.
RESEARCHER: You mean that finance is much more reliable?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: I think so. First, there are a lot more obligations regarding
finance: very simple things such as publishing the accounts, having them certified,
14

etcetera. […] The data are comparable; they’ve existed for a very long time. It’s
arithmetical, not qualitative. They aren’t declarations or protocols… but concrete
information we can verify.
RESEARCHER: So you can rely on financial criteria, but you cannot rely on ESG
criteria?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Yes, in order to work, ESG criteria should be like
financial criteria. The social rating process should be like the financial one.

Fixed-income managers lent money to borrowers for defined periods of time. The interest rates
used in such fixed-income investments changed over time for a variety of reasons, primarily related to
macroeconomic issues. For example, if the market had few actors with little cash to lend, the issuer
could charge a higher interest rate. A fixed-income manager would, therefore, assess the appropriate
interest rate by relying heavily on econometric models and the yield curve (see Figure 1), the latter
indicating the cumulative priorities of all lenders relative to a particular borrower. Given the importance
of these models, fixed-income managers argued that their investment practice was heavily mathematicsdriven. Financial models substituted for human agency, imbuing rationality into the investment process
and sidelining emotions and personal judgments in investment decisions. Fixed-income managers
strongly resisted any intervention, such as the use of ESG criteria, that could threaten the perceived
scientific basis of their valuation processes.
Insert Figure 1
ESG analysts failed to convince fixed-income managers about the validity of integrating ESG
criteria into econometric models. ESG analysts were unable to provide fixed-income managers ESG
data that could help them commensurate with the existing financial models, in part because the data did
not yet exist and in part because the ESG analysts did not fully understand the mathematics underlying
the models. Table 1 provides an example of the sector-based ranking used by ESG analysts, and Table
2 provides an example of a company factsheet that summarizes a company’s financial and ESG profiles.
Insert Tables 1 and 2
We illustrate our point through an example. Suppose Company X has a higher carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions than Company Y, but these differences are attributable to a wide range of criteria,
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including transparency in reporting, actual emissions and frequency of data collection. These
differences, however, may not reflect Company Y’s recent investments in low carbon technologies,
which will reduce carbon emissions in subsequent years. ESG analysts could provide commentary that
would offer greater meaning to the different ratings, and recommend investing in Company Y instead
of Company X. ESG analysts could provide a comparative analysis of these companies but would be
unable to answer the fixed-income managers’ two main questions: Would a company likely go bankrupt
due to these CO2 emissions? and What should the fixed-income manager do if only one of these two
companies offered bonds (i.e., buy it or not)?
An ESG analyst explained how difficult it was to meet the demands of fixed-income managers:
[The fixed-income manager] asked us to find the “philosopher’s stone” of ESG. […]
To find the essence that all asset management companies are looking for today [i.e.,
the financial value of ESG], an essence they aren’t finding. They aren’t finding it
because it’s a bit too early, there are no historical data and they find it difficult to
identify all these things.

In addition, ESG analysts found it almost impossible to understand the investment practices of
fixed-income managers and therefore to include ESG criteria, such as the yield curve, into the financial
models used by fixed-income managers. Fixed-income managers argued that their calculative devices
were too technical for individuals with so little financial background. ESG analysts then said that it was
therefore impossible to integrate ESG criteria into what seemed to be impenetrable, inflexible
econometric models.
As a result, fixed-income managers and ESG analysts did not embed ESG criteria into the fixedincome managers’ calculative devices. To overcome this impediment, the fixed-income group decided
to tack on an ESG constraint, which had little relationship with investment practices. Fixed-income
managers tried to build a portfolio with at least some proportion comprising companies with strong ESG
ratings, and with no one company with a poor rating representing a too large proportion of the total
investment. Due to the CEO’s pressure, fixed-income managers reluctantly agreed to select the bonds
as usual and to subsequently verify that the portfolio met the conditions imposed by the ESG constraint.
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The incapacity of seeing the benefits of ESG issues. Fixed-income managers’ lack of interest in ESG
issues also impeded their ability to integrate ESG criteria into the fixed-income investment practices.
Although the yield curve is future-oriented, fixed-income managers rarely incorporated this time horizon
in their analysis. Since the fixed-income managers studied interest rates that usually depended on the
company’s present borrowing capacity and market conditions, they were deeply concerned with current
liquidity and arbitrage issues. The financial performance of fixed-income investments was less related
to predicting companies’ success than to the ability to constantly capitalize on price differentials
between markets. As a fixed-income manager explained during the redesign, he had “no time to spend
on things that were not related to his daily job.” Fixed-income managers did not see ESG criteria as
assisting their job, and ESG issues were, therefore, irrelevant. The CEO explained:
There’s something abstract about fixed income; it’s an actuarial model […] fixed
income can’t be embodied in reality, so it’s difficult to incorporate ESG. […] In
fixed income, all investments involve permanent arbitrage, so there’s total volatility.
It’s very difficult to embody something that is linked to sustainability in an
investment that is, by design, volatile.

Since fixed-income managers were primarily interested in bankruptcy and this situation could
not be causally related to ESG criteria, fixed-income managers saw ESG criteria as nothing more than
a burden or a constraint, as reflected in the following dialogue.
RESEARCHER: What does SRI (Socially Responsible Investing) mean for you?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: It’s a constraint you have to abide by when investing, like
any constraint.
RESEARCHER: When a constraint applies, is it difficult to manage?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: It’s always difficult to manage a constraint.
RESEARCHER: Is that because it’s an SRI constraint?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: No, no. It’s not linked to the fact that it’s a constraint.
RESEARCHER: OK. So SRI is a constraint like any other constraint. But does it
contribute anything to your investment activity?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Personally, I don’t think so.

Equity Managers
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The rejection of financial numbers. Whereas fixed-income managers had difficulty embedding ESG
criteria into their work, equity managers were able to find a way forward. Equity managers relied on
sophisticated financial models, such as the best “optimized couple return/risk” in each sector (cf. Figure
2)—a process referred to as “portfolio optimization” (Markowitz, 1952). To match this portfolio
management approach, social rating agencies offered ESG criteria that took the form of numbers that
ranked companies within each sector. As a result of this mirroring approach, equity managers were able
to draw a direct relationship between the equity investment practices and the ESG criteria, such as when
they calculated the financial impact of CO2 emissions on EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization; see Table 1, the “beta carbone” column).
Insert Figure 2
However, unlike fixed-income managers who relied extensively on their financial models,
equity managers treated financial numbers as a doctor treats her instruments and medicines—useful for
diagnosis and treatment but the patient requires a thorough examination of the malaise. In one informal
exchange, an equity analysis said, “You need to know what is behind the numbers, get the full picture.”
The equity managers believed that each investment decision needed to be analyzed in depth. Yet, until
the redesign, they had never really paid attention to the content of the ESG criteria.
I was making my investment decisions, then I was checking whether the ESG
average grade of the portfolio (obtained by adding the ESG grade of each company
in the portfolio) was above 50/100, which eventually made me adjust the quantity of
shares I was buying or selling. I was thinking more at the aggregate level of the
portfolio, not really at the individual level of companies.

The redesign presented an occasion for the equity managers to encourage the ESG analysts to
innovate and determine whether something better was available than what the social rating agencies
could offer. Stimulated by this encouragement, ESG analysts suggested that numbers-based ESG criteria
be transformed into emojis that indicated personal judgments, as conveyed in a company factsheet (cf.
Table 3).
Insert Table 3
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ESG analysts advanced two reasons for this approach. First, ESG analysts believed that their
personal views of the companies mattered more than the ratings provided by social rating agencies.
Thus, the section on the company factsheet that summarizes the advice of ESG analysts from social
rating agencies included no figures. Several ESG analysts had previously worked for social rating
agencies and recognized that each agency exerted considerable judgment in establishing ESG criteria.
During a redesign meeting, an ESG analyst joked:
ESG ANALYST: Tell me what you want to prove and I will find the data you need!
EQUITY MANAGER: The same as in finance in fact. (Laughing)

ESG analysts felt that too much meaning or precision could not be ascribed to the numbers and,
therefore, personal analyses were more appropriate. One ESG analyst said in informal discussions, “You
know each rating agency has its own bias; you just need to know what they are, to use these data
appropriately.” They told us that visuals provided them with greater “freedom” and more “human
power.” By using emojis, ESG analysts felt that they were no longer obliged to aggregate ESG ratings,
which generated a number that did not necessarily reflect their qualitative impression of the company.
The company evaluation factsheet (e.g., Table 2) accounts for ESG analysts’ overall view of these
companies, which could not be quantified in financial numbers.
Second, ESG analysts judged numbers to be too “neutral” and “cold”. In a “snapshot”, emojis
conveyed the ESG analysts’ emotional feelings about a company: “You just see this face and you know
directly that it is bad,” an ESG analyst explained to us in an informal exchange. ESG analysts felt that
financial numbers would mask their personal values. They insisted that ESG issues were important for
what they were—societal issues—not only for their contribution to the corporation’s financial
performance. Emojis and their personal comments incarnated the ESG analysts’ “passion” and their
“fight” for societal concerns. Emojis also corresponded to their way of interacting with each other—an
instant message mode of communication they used daily and from which they borrowed the emojis
themselves.
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Equity managers believed that this approach toward visuals was promising for several reasons.
Equity managers judged that using emojis with their comments was easier to understand than the
numerical ESG criteria themselves. Equity managers did not understand the meaning of these numbers
in practice; they preferred receiving the advice of ESG analysts. Equity managers explained that they
did not expect ESG analysts to be like them: “Why have ESG analysts in such a case?”, an equity
manager commented. Equity managers, therefore, welcomed the personal approach of ESG analysts: “It
is sometimes a bit extreme, but they are doing their job.” (informal exchanges)
Using visuals for ESG criteria, in addition to the financial numbers, also permitted equity
managers to compare relevant data, but without commensurating the data, so that inconsistencies and
differences were possible to see. The two different forms of knowledge associated with visuals and
financial numbers required more cognitive attention than just financial numbers—a difference that was
epitomized in the company factsheet where financial analysis was juxtaposed with ESG analysis.
Inconsistencies could evoke a sense of dissonance, as shown by the informal exchange below at the
beginning of the redesign:
EQUITY MANAGER: Basically, ESG criteria can help me identify companies that are
overvalued by the market?
ESG ANALYST: It would clearly help you better understand the fundamentals of [a
company’s] strategies. We have data on governance, social aspects such as the employee
stress, carbon emissions, NGO controversies. We’ve got plenty of interesting stuff.
EQUITY MANAGER: But how come this company is so badly assessed by you guys? It’s a
leader, financially speaking. I don’t understand.
ESG ANALYST: Easy, they are completely behind when it comes to energy diversification.
It’s a German utility, so basically they’re into coal. They haven’t anticipated the green
revolution. This one, in comparison, is investing a lot in renewable energy and has no coal.
EQUITY MANAGER: Is that the case for many companies? Does it happen more often in
specific sectors? Countries? Is it always an environmental problem? Does it change over
time? How are the ESG criteria built?

Equity managers and ESG analysts eventually created a new investment decision matrix (cf.
Table 4). Equity managers juxtaposed ESG criteria with financial criteria, so the equity managers could
identify and favor the companies with the best combinations of ESG and financial profiles. Equity
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managers excluded from the portfolio companies considered as “laggards” in both finance and ESG.
Depending on their position in the matrix, equity managers favored companies that were over, equally,
or under represented in portfolios, compared with their benchmark index (i.e., DJ Eurostoxx 300). For
instance, a company that was assessed to be “average” in ESG criteria and a “leader” in financial criteria
was deemed equivalent to a “leader” in ESG criteria and “average” in financial criteria, thereby
demonstrating that both issues were valued equally.
Insert Table 4
The exchange below illustrates how an equity manager and an ESG analyst explained to
potential new clients their evaluation criteria based on emojis. It shows the strong belief of the team in
their new investment system:
TRUSTEE: So how do you manage the ESG and financial aspects of the fund?
EQUITY MANAGER: We have developed an investment decision matrix that combines financial
and ESG analyses. The idea is to make investment managers and ESG analysts talk to each
other, exchange about the companies, especially those having contradictory evaluation. (…)
ESG ANALYST: We have developed this system of emojis whose idea is to force each ESG
analyst to step in the evaluation process, to give his/her recommendation, exactly as a
financial analyst would do. (…)
TRUSTEE: But how can you be sure that a company should be excluded?
EQUITY MANAGER: Of course, one never knows the future but we did a lot of back testing. We
know these companies very well.

The expected benefits of ESG issues. The desire to give ESG and financial criteria the same weight in
the decision-making process notably emerged since equity managers believed that improvements were
possible. Equity managers did not perceive their existing calculative devices to be fixed and constant,
but instead as incomplete and open-ended. In particular, both equity managers and ESG analysts were
intrigued that they could not explain why some companies with poor ESG ratings performed well
financially, and other companies with good ESG ratings performed poorly. Their attempts to understand
this situation prompted cooperation and fostered mutual dependencies between equity managers and
ESG analysts.
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Equity managers’ future orientation of investment strategies was also essential in triggering
interest in embracing ESG criteria. Because they believed that a firm’s market value was directly related
to its ability to manage ESG issues, equity managers trusted that ESG criteria would identify companies
whose value would increase in the future. ESG criteria were expanding their knowledge of companies.
An equity manager explained:
I don’t want to keep a sort of watertight division between ESG analysis and my
analysis. I want them to be correlated. Otherwise, it would mean that I select issuers
on criteria I can’t verify at all, and that wouldn’t be credible for clients.

Equity managers did not want to translate ESG criteria into financial numbers. Instead, they
were interested in the tensions that emerged between the ESG and financial criteria. They wanted to
understand what was behind the financial numbers, not what was displayed. In other words, they were
interested in the unseen risks that did not appear in the financial numbers.
The matrix decision and the evaluation factsheet were used as a basis for discussing the
discrepancies between ESG and financial criteria. For instance, the “consensus” section on the company
evaluation factsheet in Table 2 shows that while brokerage companies recommended buying more shares
of the company under study (see consensus), the equity manager suggested selling the shares. The
justification is written below the financial ratios and, interestingly, uses arguments from ESG criteria
(i.e., carbon emissions) that were not directly visible in the financial numbers. The text in the financial
section of the evaluation factsheet illustrates the penetration of the ESG issues into the financial world
of the equity manager. As such, both the ESG analysts and equity managers questioned the industry’s
trust in financial numbers.
At the end of the redesign, equity managers judged that ESG criteria had enriched their
investment activities by making them more interesting and more elaborate. The processes of selecting,
projecting and evaluating the outcomes of market transactions had been transformed.
RESEARCHER: Has the incorporation of SRI changed the way you invest?
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes. It’s made it more interesting, more elaborate and it
enhances the investment activity. […] It’s surprising, but you sometimes see
companies with a very good financial profile and a very bad SRI profile. When you
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read financial analyses, they appear to be excellent. But when you listen to the ESG
analysts, they describe things that aren’t working inside those companies. So I
wonder how such companies can succeed at the end of the day. How can they make
up for bad working conditions, for example?

ESG issues had become an integral part of equity investment practices because ESG criteria not
only informed financial success but also reflected the company’s social responsibility, which equity
analysts saw as an increasingly important dimension in their job. The world as perceived and evaluated
by the equity managers shifted from being only financial to also involving ESG criteria, which was
reinforced over the years.
Our job is to generate returns but in a way that is not detrimental to the planet. I mean
the world has changed our job too. We are accountable to the society for what we
do, and this is good. We have to find new ways of investing that incorporate both
dimensions. (equity manager, 2015)

Epilogue
We interviewed equity managers and ESG analysts again in 2015. These actors gave the impression that
they were incorporating both financial and ESG issues into their work. Although we cannot deduce a
causal relationship, the equity fund performed well financially, particularly when compared with the
fixed-income fund that significantly under-performed in the subsequent years (both vis-à-vis the
benchmark and the other funds of its category). The equity fund also received several ESG awards from
the investment industry.
The company maintained all the calculative devices that were fabricated during the redesign,
but omitted the emojis from the company evaluation factsheet for several reasons. First, the Bloomberg
terminals used by managers to buy and sell shares could not support functions that included emojis.
Second, some clients appeared to be uncomfortable with the use of emojis in a financial context,
although the reasons for their discomfort were unclear. As a result, the CEO found it prudent to remove
emojis from institutional documents (after they appeared in these documents for two years). In response,
ESG analysts replaced the emojis with color codes. ESG analysts were still encouraged to offer their
personal opinions.
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We maintain our SRI approach; it’s constraining but it’s SRI. The clients who are
not convinced by SRI, we won’t convince them. (equity manager, 2015)

In fixed-income investments, ESG analysts still attempted to integrate quantitative ESG criteria
into the financial models, by seeking a relationship between ESG criteria and bankruptcy risk. In our
2015 wave of interviews, we expected the new fixed-income manager to tell us that fixed-income
managers had failed to integrate ESG criteria into their financial analyses, and she did not disappoint,
saying that “nothing had changed really.” We were thus surprised when she appeared to be passionate
about the new green energy fixed-income fund she wanted to launch:
It’s a real long-term conviction. We could all win by financing companies that would
help transitioning towards green energy. (...) I mean we are parents too. We want the
best world for our children. (fixed-income manager, 2015)

She was inspired to develop this product to help build a better world for future generations. At
the time of the interview, she was trying to convince her chief to foster change and innovation by
softening the heavy use of financial numbers in fixed-income investments. She believed that social
responsibility would require a change of perspective. When we asked whether she planned to transform
ESG criteria into financial criteria and then integrate the financial criteria into all credit ratings, she
answered:
No, I don’t think so. It will be a real impact fund. We need to integrate ESG criteria:
we should start from them. We should not start from the market, not from the
benchmark. (…) We are lucky enough to be part of a generation more sensitive to
these topics; we have more resources to think about it. The fixed-income profession
is made of old dinosaurs who are afraid. It’s a fear of the elderly who don’t want to
change. The next generation of professionals might be more sensitive to these
problems. (fixed-income manager, 2015)

She wanted to embrace ESG issues for what they were, not for what they could bring to financial
performance. As a fixed-income manager, she believed that she could use her investment practices to
serve society at large.
Discussion
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This research examines how investment managers use calculative devices to accommodate societal
issues in their investment decisions. Although previous literature has examined the role of ESG criteria
in investment decisions, it has largely assumed that financializing ESG issues is unavoidable (Chelli &
Gendron, 2013; Chiapello, 2014; Déjean et al., 2004). In practice, the inability to design calculative
devices that assign a market value to ESG criteria often leads to ESG issues being abandoned (Huault
& Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). While previous research has studied the benefits of visuals in nurturing
questions among organizational actors (e.g., Busco & Quattrone, 2015; Kaplan, 2011), these studies say
little about how such questioning affects decision making.
This article fills these gaps by studying how two groups of investment managers, specifically
fixed-income and equity managers within a French asset management company, responded to ESG
criteria, which carried different values from those associated with financialization. Consistent with prior
literature (e.g., Déjean et al., 2004; Giamporcaro & Gond, 2016), we found that fixed-income managers
attempted to financialize ESG issues, and subsequently deemed these issues to be too difficult to include
in the financial models in use, and therefore did not integrate them into their investment processes. In
contrast, equity managers introduced visuals, specifically emojis, to assess ESG criteria in their decision
making. In doing so, equity managers deliberately created a sense of dissonance between financial
numbers and the visuals, which fostered creative friction (Stark, 2011). The rest of this section elaborates
on the implications of our findings to the study of financialization and calculative devices.
An Alternative Path to Financialization
Equity managers felt that visuals helped to better value firms. Visuals ensured ESG criteria remained
independent and seperate from financial numbers, rather than disappearing through the commensuration
process (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). The emojis in the company factsheets brought attention, in a
different way from financial numbers, to the performance of the company. Equity managers appreciated
that the emotive expressions of emojis were connected to social and environmental problems and
avoided the need to apply precision to imprecise concepts. Emojis expressed the opinions that could not
be expressed in financial numbers. Unlike fixed-income managers who aimed to render ESG criteria
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into “objective” and “scientific” financial criteria, equity managers encouraged ESG analysts to use their
personal judgments.
Equity managers also liked visuals because they incarnated the differences between ESG and
financial criteria, such as when a company performed well financially but was rated poor
environmentally. Such contrasts led to equity managers engaging more deliberately and carefully with
the data, rather than automatically applying financial analysis. Equity managers used the emojis that
embodied ESG criteria to distance themselves from their own calculative devices to better identify the
factors that financial markets did not seem to value. The visual vis-à-vis the numerical prevented equity
managers from standardizing the analysis and forced equity managers to focus on each company’s
specific data. Visuals detuned routines, so that equity managers needed to look behind the financial
numbers and not just apply simple aggregated numbers in their decision analysis. As a result, equity
managers improved their judgment skills, as we illustrated in the text on carbon emissions in the
financial evaluation section of the evaluation factsheet (see Table 2).
Our study shows that creating a sense of dissonance between ESG and financial criteria also
enabled the pursuit of ESG goals. With ESG issues standing apart from financial concerns, ESG issues
garnered their own value, not in service of financial performance, but for what they were: environmental,
social and governmental concerns. Visuals made the differences between financial and ESG issues
visually perceptible. In doing so, ESG goals held the same importance as financial goals, as
demonstrated by the joint decision matrix in Table 4. As a result, equity managers perceived firms
performance as not only financial, but also societal. Thus, societal concerns became a new and critical
consideration for equity managers.
Prior research has highlighted the financialization of economy and society (Alvehus & Spicer,
2012; Chiapello, 2014), but our findings show that non-financial calculative devices can advance social
and environmental concerns into the financial sector. Such inclusion, however, might in itself indirectly
contribute to the growing influence of the financial industry on society because ESG criteria are also
used to assess market value. The penetration of societal benefits into the financial industry is likely a
side effect of the financialization of the rest of the economy and society.
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Since an increasing number of public actors are asking financial actors to solve societal issues,
financial actors are feeling increasingly responsible for addressing environmental and social problems,
a movement that is also seen in academic finance (Marti & Scherer, 2016). We cannot comment on
whether this inclusion of social and environmental issues is actually a new form of financializing society
or an account of (de)financializing finance, but this question warrants further study. The distinction
between finance and society is indeed increasingly tenuous. More research is needed to evaluate the
effects of adopting such forms of calculative devices on a wide range of investment managers and on
ESG issues themselves.
How Visuals Simulate a Sense of Dissonance
By identifying the conditions under which visuals can help simulate a creative friction between financial
and ESG criteria, this study enriches previous research on the sense of dissonance (Beunza & Stark,
2012; Stark, 2011). Existing research argues that organizations introduce a sense of dissonance by
creating physical spaces that encourage interactions among organizational members (Farias, 2015;
Hutter et al., 2015), favor different hierarchical relationships, or “heterarchy” (Stark, 2011) or combine
different accounts of performance (Chenhall, Hall, & Smith, 2013).
We complement this research by showing that a sense of dissonance can also be spurred by the
introduction of calculative devices whose physical form differs from the established form and cannot be
absorbed through commensuration or other processes. This combination of calculative devices creates
dissonance beyond personal relationships among individuals, enabling a sense of dissonance at the
organizational level of analysis.
We also show that the physical form of the calculative devices that trigger dissonance matters.
Emojis and company factsheets possessed qualities that made them attractive to both equity managers
and ESG analysts. First, emojis were familiar to both communities. All those within the organization
used emojis in emails or instant messages. Second, emojis conveyed information efficiently. They
provided equity managers with an instant snapshot of a company’s ESG performance. The emojis were
consistent with the organization’s communications style and the fast pace of the financial markets;
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emails could be exchanged containing only a title and an image, and, if needed, additional explanation
would be offered.
Emojis’ human-like faces captured emotion through their expressions, in stark contrast to the
neutrality projected by financial numbers; both elements were essential to creating a sense of dissonance.
Visuals generated positive emotions, such as enthusiasm when the equity manager discovered
information previously unknown, thereby helping to alleviate the anxiety generated by financial
numbers and the impossible expectations of objectivity incurred by their use (see, for example, Taffler
et al., 2017). The incompleteness of emojis generated new knowledge by encouraging equity managers
to interpret the information provided by ESG analysts and thereby participate in the co-creation of
knowledge. The physical structure of the company factsheets that showed financial and ESG criteria in
opposition also contributed to rendering visible the dissonance between both. Emojis could not easily
be commensurated with financial numbers.
Although we argue that different forms of calculative devices can spur a sense of dissonance,
we also acknowledge that some individuals are more likely to embrace dissonance than others. We found
that fixed-income managers refused ESG criteria because they were judged as too “qualitative” to be
included in their financial models. Individuals indeed tend to favor the techniques that are central to
their occupations’ social practices (Callon, 1998).
This finding offers additional evidence of the importance of the form of calculative devices in
creating a sense of dissonance. It also highlights the limitations and dangers of techniques that become
so institutionalized or automated that they no longer evoke any dissonance that sparks deeper thinking.
Financial numbers offer the benefits of efficiency because they can commensurate different types of
information consistently, which retains meaning among diverse communities. However, financial
numbers are limited in their capacity to sustain the complexity of human endeavors, such as ESG issues
and emotions. In contrast, visuals offer a way of conveying information efficiently, and have the added
benefit of not being easily commensurable and absorbed into financial numbers. We are not suggesting
that financial numbers cannot create a sense of dissonance, as they sometimes do when two seemingly
irreconcilable numbers are compared (Beunza & Stark, 2012). However, we are suggesting that there
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are methods other than financial numbers that can efficiently convey information, while sustaining a
sense of dissonance.
Just as calculative devices can evolve, individuals can change. Our epilogue suggests that fixedincome managers could abandon financial numbers and approach the ESG criteria as the equity
managers had—by considering them for what they are, not for what they could offer financially.
Although the article displays the difficulty of reversing the bias for financialization, the exchange with
this fixed-income manager also indicates that there is no “fatal remedy” (Power, 2004, p. 767) to
financial numbers.
The Role of Visuals in Organizations
This article contributes to previous research on the use of visuals in organizations. Previous studies show
the benefits of visuals in generating new rationales by being a “means of interrogation and mediation”
(Busco & Quattrone, 2015, p. 1250)—for example, the Balanced Scorecard or PowerPoint (e.g., Busco
& Quattrone, 2015; Kaplan, 2011). Previous research on visuals argues that the flexibility and
multivocality of visuals facilitate knowledge creation (Höllerer et al., 2013; Meyer et al., 2013).
The dissonance approach we develop in this article brings a new perspective to the generative
power of visuals. Visuals can help stimulate new knowledge by introducing an alternative calculative
device that is incommensurable with the dominant form of calculative devices in use — here financial
numbers, thereby creating a sense of dissonance (Stark, 2011). Visuals can also be used to convey
information of a different nature, such as when the CEO decided to include emojis, then colors in the
company factsheets. The goal of such visuals was to spur clients’ interest in ESG criteria.
Our study also shows that visuals are not only “rhetorical machines” (Busco and Quattrone,
2015, p. 1237)—e.g., wheels, PowerPoint or trees—that all organizational members could basically
interpret as they wanted. Emojis were not “empty” in our study. They were full of content, but not
content that could be easily expressed in numbers or words. The emojis conveyed emotions, personal
judgments and choices. Our study hence demonstrates that visuals can exhibit expertise, to the same
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extent that financial numbers do—despite their apparent lack of “scientific” anchorage (Chua, 1996;
Whitley, 1986).
Last, our article suggests that as financial numbers point to financialization, visuals can also
carry specific meanings beyond their specific situations of use (e.g., incarnating “society”). For instance,
emojis helped humanize social and environmental issues, notably through their human-like faces.
Emojis incarnated the ESG issues and rendered them visible in the investment processes. If ESG analysts
had used only the numbers offered by social rating agencies during the redesign of investment processes,
the inclusion of societal concerns would have been unlikely.
Numerous aspects of life may be important to organizational decision processes but are not
considered because of the complexities of financialization; such aspects include intuition, love,
community, spirituality, family and nature. The primacy given to financial numbers and financialization
has rendered many issues invisible, despite their capacity to improve not only the organization’s
performance but also societal well-being. For example, many theoretically abundant forms of calculative
devices, such as images, text, videos, sounds, virtual reality, physicality and even smell, can help to
elevate various aspects of life. Each form of calculative device may invoke different behaviors toward
previously invisible criteria or goals and therefore each such form warrants attention. Behavioural
research might be particularly appropriate for this purpose, as it could help us understand how and why
organizational members react differently to different types of calculative devices.
Conclusion
This article suggests that research on the integration of ESG criteria into organizational practices needs
to take the limits of financialization more seriously because such an approach not only discards difficultto-value activities but also ignores the inherent non-financial values embedded in ESG issues. By
assuming that financial actors require calculability in the form of financial numbers because they have
always been portrayed this way, previous research may have actually contributed to the financialization
of societal issues.
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As societies recognize the importance of tackling social and environmental issues (e.g., climate
change, poverty, hunger and inequality), problems related to the joint pursuit of financial and societal
benefits will likely continue to surface. Different forms of calculative devices may offer an opportunity
to consider the interface between finance and society, allowing the values of each to be sustained. It
seems an egregious error to believe that one calculative device should be privileged over another or that
the tide of financial drift cannot be reversed. Markets are thought to be self-fulfilling, and such a fate
should be expected of our artifacts and rhetoric. As organizational scholars, we have the ability to make
these distinctions carefully. If alternative ways of conducting business are to be considered, we must
acknowledge that the new goals in capitalism might require new calculative devices, even if the
foundational knowledge for these forms has not yet been developed.
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Figure 1. Example of yield curve and spread analysis.
Source: Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/solution/bloombergterminal-learnmore/?utm_medium=dotcom&utm_campaign=Dotcom&utm_source=Website&utm_content
=bcom-article&bbgsum=dg-ws-prof-bcom-a1
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Table 1. Example of corporations’ ESG ratings.

ESG: environmental, social and governance; ICB: industry classification benchmark; ISR: Socially responsible investment
Source: Internal Document, Company under study
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Table 2. Example of a company evaluation factsheet.

SRI: socially responsible investment; LT: long-term; EBITDA: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; PER: price–earning ratio; CSR:
corporate social responsibility; SD: standard deviation
Source: Internal Document, Company under study

Figure 2. Example of portfolio optimization application using MATLAB, Financial Toolbox
and object-oriented design
Source: MathWorks Inc., http://www.mathworks.com/products/finance/features.html.
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Table 3. Emojis and their meanings in French and English
Emoji

Meaning (French)

Meaning (English)

A éviter à tout prix

To be avoided at all costs

Bien

Good

Coup de coeur

Kudos

Décevant

Disappointing

Dynamisme

Dynamism

Moyen

So so

Ouh la

Uh oh

Prometteuse

Promising

Sans dynamisme

Dull

Super

Super

Source: Internal Document, Company under study
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Table 4. Decision matrix used in equity investment.

SRI: socially responsible investment
Source: Internal Document, Company under study
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LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Data sources.

Type

Participative
observation

Occurrences

Working Group’s Weekly
Meeting

29 meetings lasting between 30 minutes
and three hours: 25 Sept 2007–04 Oct
2007–09 Oct 2007–16 Oct 2007–23 Oct
2007–05 Nov 2007–14 Nov 2007–27
Nov 2007– 4 Dec 2007–18 Dec 2007–
08 Jan 2008–10 Jan 2008–26 Feb 2008–
29 Feb 2008–11 Mar 2008–18 Mar
2008–25 Mar 2008–01 Apr 2008– 08
Apr 2008–15 Apr 2008–29 Apr 2008–13
May 2008–20 May 2008–27 May 2008–
17 June 2008–18 June 2008–24 June
2008–15 July 2008–29 July 2008

Day-to-day observation

2006-2009: Two and a half years (350
pages of notes, single-spaced)
2015: Two days (5 pages of notes,
single-spaced)

Interviews

External events (invitations
to tender, meetings with
consultants, road shows,
etc.)

2006-2009: 40 per year on average

Semi-structured interviews
with organizational actors
(23 in total)

1st set of interviews (2006): Fund of
Funds Manager; Financial Analyst;
Equity Manager; Middle Office
Manager; Lawyer; Sales Manager; CEO;
ESG Analyst

For each asset management
class (equity, fixed-income,
fund of funds), we were
given access to the head of
the team. We could

2nd set of interviews (2009): Equity
Manager; Fixed-Income Manager; Head
of SRI & Development; CEO; ESG
Analyst (2); Sales Manager; Head of
Support functions;
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Type

Documents

Emails

Occurrences

informally exchange with
the rest of the team.

3rd set of interviews (2015): Equity
Manager; Fixed-Income Manager; Head
of SRI & Development; ESG Analyst
(2); Sales Manager (1); Fund of Funds
Manager (1)

ESG & Financial Artifacts

3 final Excel files & methodological
supports

Company factsheets

93

Minutes of the working
group meetings

23

Exchanges between
members of working groups
(2006-2009)

409

ESG: environmental, social and governance; SRI: socially responsible investment

Appendix 2. Fixed-income investment process

ESG: environmental, social and governance

Appendix 3. Equity investment process
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ESG: environmental, social and governance
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